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Close your eyes and envision wilderness. If you are fortunate
enough to be able to do so, picture your favorite wilderness. (Mine is the
Oh Be Joyful in Colorado.) What do you see? Does a river run through
it? A cascading mountain brook with an icy breath? Are there cirques full
of everlasting snow dotted in July with vermilion and gold flowers?
Tams of copper green glacial water reflecting white clouds sailing high
overhead? Even if your imagined wilderness is a desert of rose-hued,
striated rock and silent slot canyons or a horizon-reaching expanse of
subtle shades of brown under an immense blue sky; water, or its scarcity,
shapes the landscape, the colors, the wildlife, the experience of the place.
In the desert, heat and light create mirages-the dream of water.
Water is integral to wilderness, essential to sustaining the commu-
nities of life that exist within the boundaries human beings draw around
wild places. Without the full measure of its naturally occurring water, a
wilderness will change; deprived of water it will die.
In contrast to wilderness, law is a creation of human beings, a
framework for decision making, sets of rules and principles for ordering
society and human interactions. It is constructed of rights and obliga-
tions. It determines who may use or consume natural resources, such as
land, minerals, and water. In the western United States, water is essential
not only to sustaining life, but to the development of the region. Water is
the limiting factor for all growth and economic activity. The legal system
of water allocation that grew up in the West emphasizes putting water to
work wherever it is needed, and gives priority in use to those who arrive
first and divert water from its natural courses for application to activities
beneficial to humans. In the West water is separated from the land of its
origins and moved over mountains. Until very recently, water left in
streams for aesthetic or fish and wildlife purposes was viewed as wasted,
and those who wasted water lost the right to use it.
Water and water rights are not the same thing. Wilderness needs
water, but as a consequence of history and law, there is a question of
whether-as a legal matter-areas designated as wilderness by Congress
have rights to the water that arises within and flows through them. Al-
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though thirty-four years have passed since the Wilderness Act of 1964'
created the National Wilderness Preservation System, the issue of wil-
derness water rights remains unresolved. The issue exists because Con-
gress was silent in the Wilderness Act about water rights for the areas to
be included in the Wilderness System.
Until 1988, the prevailing assumption was that congressional desig-
nation of a wilderness impliedly reserved sufficient federal water rights
to fulfill the purposes of the designation. This presumption was based on
the Supreme Court's application of the doctrine of federal reserved water
rights to a variety of federal land systems, although the Court has not
considered the issue of wilderness water rights directly. It was also based
on the consistent position of the Solicitor of the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior that wilderness has federal reserved water rights.2 In
1988, following federal court decisions declaring wilderness to be a res-
ervation carrying with it implied federal water rights, the Solicitor re-
versed the Department's position and decreed that the Wilderness Act
specifically disclaimed the creation of any new water rights Armed with
this Solicitor's Opinion, opponents of wilderness and some members of
Congress claimed that wilderness lacks federal reserved water rights,
and, therefore, any water for wilderness must be expressly provided in
statutory language."
The environmental community was deeply divided about how to re-
spond to these assertions. Some environmentalists argued for the express
reservation of water rights, to assure that wilderness areas designated by
Congress would have the water necessary to their survival. For others,
silence on water rights was golden. These environmentalists were con-
cerned that, by accepting the view that express water rights language was
necessary, they would be supporting the claim that wilderness areas
designated by bills without such language have no water rights. The de-
bate resulted in the defeat of a number of wilderness bills and the passage
of wilderness legislation that include a variety of water rights provisions.
5
Few wilderness areas have been designated since the early 1990s, in
part because of conflicts over water rights. The wilderness bills that
Congress has enacted included express references to water rights.6 In.
1. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994)).
2. See 86 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 553, 563--64 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Solicitor's Opinion].
3. See 96 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 211, 213 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Solicitor's Opinion].
4. See Janice L. Weis, Federal Reserved Water Rights in Wilderness Areas: A Progress
Report on a Western Water Fight, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 125, 146-48 (1987) (discussing the
legislative reaction to the then pending Colorado wilderness bill and noting legislative opposition to
the claim that wilderness has federal reserved water rights).
5. Cf id. at 146-47 (describing two Colorado water rights bills that "died without passage").
6. See John D. Leshy, Instream Flow Rights: The Private and Public Roles, C616 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 163, 167 (1991).
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1994, the United States Department of Justice directed that the Solici-
tor's Opinion of 1988 be withdrawn pending a reexamination of the pol-
icy it expressed! The withdrawal of the Solicitor's Opinion removed the
bar to federal agency claims of reserved water rights for wilderness in
general stream adjudications. It did not resolve the issue, however, and
the application of the federal reserved water rights doctrine to wilderness
remains unsettled.
This article will tell some of this story. It will analyze the issue of
federal reserved water rights for wilderness, beginning with a bit of his-
tory on the development of the prior appropriation doctrine of water allo-
cation in the West and the relationship between federal and state water
law. It will examine the genesis of the federal reserved water rights doc-
trine and its application by the Supreme Court to a variety of federal land
systems, and discuss the efforts of the Sierra Club to force the Forest
Service to claim water rights for wilderness in stream adjudications in
Colorado.
The article will then review the aftermath of the Sierra Club's effort,
during which the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior repudiated
the Department's long-standing recognition of federal reserved water
rights for wilderness, and members of Congress wrangled over water
rights language for wilderness bills under consideration.
Finally, the article will look at where the issue stands today. The
controversy precipitated by the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion did not last all
that long, yet the implications remain with us. Despite the withdrawal of
the Opinion, states and private parties oppose federal claims to reserved
water rights for wilderness.8 Congress continues to fight about water
rights language in wilderness bills. Because of the uncertainty about
whether wilderness has federal reserved water rights, the question will
reappear each time Congress considers a new addition to the National
Wilderness Preservation System, or whenever the United States seeks to
claim water rights for wilderness in a general stream adjudication.
Whichever approach is taken may affect areas already in the Wilderness
System. Wilderness, therefore, may, or may not, have rights to water.
I. A BIT OF HISTORY
Stephen Ambrose in his riveting account of the Lewis and Clark ex-
pedition said that one might "[als well try to stop an avalanche as to stop
the moving frontier." From the early 1800s on, land-hungry settlers
7. See Water Rights Under the Wilderness Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,692 (1994).
8. Cf Memorandum from Debbie Sease, Sierra Club, and Nancy Green, The Wilderness
Society, to Western Field Representatives of both organizations on Water Rights and Silence 1-3
(Jan. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Sease & Green Memorandum] (on file with author) (describing the need
to include water Tights language in wilderness bills).
9. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER LEWIS, THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST 337 (1996).
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pushed west beyond the confining hills of the Allegheny and Appala-
chian Mountains in an ever-increasing tide. "American immigrants and
emigrants wanted their share of land-free land-a farm in the family-
the dream of European peasants for hundreds of years-the New World's
great gift to the old.""' For nearly a century, but particularly between
1841 and the 1880s, the federal government promoted this settlement as
the basis for national strength and security, by rewarding almost anyone
who undertook the hardships of pioneering with land or natural re-
sources." The federal government made outright land grants to new
states, military veterans and other individuals; promises of land in ex-
change for work were given to homesteaders, ranchers, and miners.'2
Later, Congress gave extensive grants to railroads, reclamation projects,
and timber production.'3 All of this expressed the national policy of dis-
position of the public domain into the hands of the newly created Ameri-
can public.
The people who traveled west to settle and farm the land brought
with them "hopes, dreams, and a totally unworkable system of water
rights-the riparian system."' The riparian system, inherited from Eng-
land, is suited to areas of abundant rainfall and numerous water courses.
In the riparian system, the right to use water is incidental to ownership of
land adjoining a water course. The governing principle is one of reason-
able use. Riparian rights are correlative; each riparian owner has an equal
right to use water and must share in times of shortage. Riparian rights are
not lost through non-use.'"
The arid conditions of the West made water the limiting factor for
all land use and development.'6 Miners struggling to wrest metallic riches
from the earth and irrigators laboring to keep crops and cattle alive in a
region with rainfall of less than twenty inches per year quickly developed
customs and practices that reflected the reality of the climate. " The first
person on a stream to divert the water and apply it to a beneficial use,
such as mining, stock watering or agriculture, established a priority to
10. Id.
11. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
55-58 (3d ed. 1993).
12. See id at 67,79-80, 83, 85,91-93.
13. See id. at97-98, 103-06.
14. Nicholas Targ, Water Law on the Public Lands: Facing a Fork in the River, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 14, 14 (1997).
15. For a discussion of the riparian system, see A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
AND RESOURCES § 3 (1998).
16. See WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN (1954); WALLACE
STEGNER, THE SOUND OF MOUNTAIN WATER 33 (1969). See generally MARC REISNER, CADILLAC
DESERT (1986) (discussing the development of water rights in various Western states); Wallace
Stegner, The Function of Aridity, WILDERNESS, Fall 1987, at 14-21, 34 [hereinafter Stegner, Aridity]
(discussing the effects of inadequate water supplies in the western United States).
17. See DYAN ZASLOWSKY & T.H. WATKINS, THESE AMERICAN LANDS 110, 118 (2d ed.
1994).
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continue that use, even if later arrivals had no water." Water use was not
incident to land ownership; it could not be, since the land was in the
public domain and owned by the federal government. Although a water
right was regarded as a vested property right, a water user could not sit
on the porch and watch water flow by. Water left in a stream was
"wasted" and rights to its use lost."' Court decisions and legislatures sub-
sequently legitimized these customs and practices as the prior appropria-
tion doctrine of water allocation."0
Although it clearly did not need to do so, the federal government
acquiesced in the establishment of water rights in the West through local
customs and state laws. In a series of statutes between 1866 and 1877,21
Congress acknowledged the validity of water rights granted by "local
custom, laws, and decisions of courts."2 The best known of these stat-
utes, the Desert Land Act,' provided that settlers and homesteaders on
the public lands would have rights to water "necessarily used for the pur-
pose of irrigation and reclamation," and that all other unappropriated
water, from whatever source, "shall remain and be held free for the ap-
propriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining, and manufactur-
ing purposes subject to existing rights."'2
The Supreme Court enthusiastically supported federal acquiescence
to state water law. In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
18. See Stegner, Aridity, supra note 16, at 16.
19. See REISNER, supra note 16, at 12. Reisner expressed the idea as follows:
In the West, lack of water is the central fact of existence, and a whole culture and set of
values have grown up around it. In the East, to "waste" water is to consume it needlessly
or excessively. In the West, to waste water is not to consume it-to let it flow unimpeded
and undiverted down rivers.
id.
20. Cf., e.g., TARLOCK, supra note 15, § 5 (describing the loss of water rights through nonuse
and abandonment under the prior appropriation doctrine); Owen L. Anderson et al., Prior Appro-
priation, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, §§ 11-15, 17 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (explaining that
under certain circumstances, water rights may be lost by nonuse).
21. See Pamela Baldwin, Wilderness Areas and Federal Water Rights, Cong. Research Serv.
1, 4 (Jan. 4, 1989). As noted by Ms. Baldwin, the Supreme Court, in United States v. New Mexico,
cited congressional hearings listing 37 statutes "in which Congress has expressly recognized the
importance of deferring to state water law." United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 n.5
(1978) (citing Federal-State Water Rights: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation
and Reclamation of the Senate Comt on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 302-10 (1964));
see Baldwin, supra, at 4.
22. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners Over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1994)).
The provision, which is typical of the statutes noted above, states in full:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural,
manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized
and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and decision of courts, the possessors and
owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same ....
Id.
23. Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321
(1994)).
24. Id. § 1, 19 Stat. at 377.
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Cement Co.,' for example, the Court praised the states' prior appropria-
tion doctrine as essential to "the future growth and well-being of the en-
tire region."' The Desert Land Act, said the Court, "effected a severance
of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from
the land itself."" Thus, "following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-
navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris,
subject to the plenary control of the designated states. ''U
HI. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS DocTRINE
A. Reserved Water Rights for Native American Reservations: Winters v.
United States"
Despite the assumption that state law would govern the appropriation
of water, even on federal lands, the states' right to control water alloca-
tion was, and continues to be, subject to overriding federal power. Under
the Constitution, Congress has the authority to regulate and control navi-
gation2 interstate commerce,3 and the federal lands." Moreover, state
law in conflict with federal law must yield under the Constitution's Su-
premacy Clause." The Supreme Court has consistently held that federal
water rights exist where Congress chooses to preempt state law, and
where necessary, to fulfill federal purposes.' These rights are reserved
from state appropriation and provide for federally controlled and man-
aged water for the public lands.35
Of course, the federal government may apply for water rights under
state law, as any other property owner. There are many occasions, how-
ever, when a right acquired under state law may not adequately serve the
federal purposes.' For example, some state laws require a diversion of
water as a prerequisite to obtaining a water right, which may interfere
25. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
26. California Or. Power, 295 U.S. at 157.
27. Id. at 158.
28. Id. at 163--64.
29. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
30. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,703 (1899); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824).
31. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that water itself is an article of com-
merce and, therefore, is subject to federal regulation. 458 U.S. 941,953-54 (1982)
32. The "Property Clause" authorizes Congress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2. The federal government owns the public domain as both an ordinary proprietor and as sover-
eign. Cf Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (interpreting the federal government's
authority over the public lands as virtually without limitation).
33. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States.. . shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
34. See 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 328,346 (1982); Targ, supra note 14, at 16.
35. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
36. See Baldwin, supra note 21, at 7.
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with a federal purpose to maintain an area in a natural condition. Even
those states which recognize instrean flow rights usually severely limit
the quantity of those rights and rank them behind consumptive uses.37
Furthermore, it seems somewhat incongruous for the federal government
to have to go with bucket in hand to the states to ask for water to sustain
the natural resources of the federal lands.9
The Supreme Court first alluded to the existence of federal reserved
water rights in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.9 In
Rio Grande, the Court considered whether an irrigation company, oper-
ating under state law, could be enjoined from diverting water at a rate
that threatened the navigability of a river.' The Court held that the state
law was subject to the federal government's superior authority over
navigable waters:
[I]n the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot by
its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of
lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far
at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government
property...."
The doctrine of federal reserved rights was more fully developed in
Winters v. United States; indeed, it is frequently called the "Winters
Doctrine." The Winters case involved a conflict between claims for water
of Native Americans living on the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana
and upstream settlers using water pursuant to perfected state water
rights. '3 In 1888, the reservation originally set aside for many of the tribes
living in Montana was reduced in size, with the agreement of the Native
Americans." The smaller reservation was thought to be more suitable for
37. See id.; see also A. Dan Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream Flow Rights: New Public
Western Water Rights, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1, 24-2 to -3 (1979) (describing instream
use as vulnerable).
38. The United States does participate as a party in general stream adjudications, which are
proceedings held pursuant to state water law to determine the rights and priorities of all water rights
holders on a stream or stream system. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994),
waives the sovereign immunity of the United States and permits the federal government to be joined
in lawsuits adjudicating all the rights on a river system, including federal reserved rights. See Dugan
v. Rank, 372 U.S. 509, 618 (1963); see also Tarlock, supra note 15, § 7.03 (discussing how admin-
istrative adjudication qualifies for a waiver of sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment
provided there is ultimately a judicial determination of the claims). For a history of the McCarran
Amendment, see John E. Thorson, State Watershed Adjudications: Approaches and Alternatives, 42
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-6 to -7, 22-13 to -19 (1996).
39. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
40. See Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 690.
41. Id. at 703.
42. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
43. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
44. See id. at 575-76.
1999]
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promoting an agrarian way of life.' It also permitted the United States to
make the remaining land available for settlement.'
The settlers who moved into the newly opened lands wanted water
for agriculture and domestic purposes. By 1900, upstream settlers began
to appropriate water from the Milk River, diminishing the flow available
to the Native Americans.' The United States, on behalf of the tribes,
asserted a right to the water, based on Congress's purposes in creating
the reservation.'
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Native Americans, finding
that water sufficient to carry out the purposes of the reservation was re-
served when the lands were set aside.' The Court acknowledged that
neither the treaty with the Native Americans establishing the reservation
nor the act of Congress ratifying that treaty explicitly created water
rights." The Court reasoned, however, that Congress intended to reserve
the water simultaneously with the land because, without water, the arid
land would be useless and the purpose of the agreement would be de-
feated." Thus, "[tihe power of the [federal] government to reserve the
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not
denied, and could not be."'5 Winters established that water may be re-
served by implication, notwithstanding state law or the existence of state
water rights conferred after the creation of a federal land reservation. The
Winters Doctrine superimposes judicially created federal water rights on
a state system that bases water rights on prior appropriation.
B. Extension of the Winters Doctrine to Other Federal Land Reservations
For many years, it was assumed that the Winters Doctrine applied
only to Native American reservations.3 The Supreme Court reinforced
this presumption in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co.,' in which the Court reaffirmed the effect of the Desert Land
Act on the water resources of the public domain.' It was not until 1955
that the Supreme Court held that federal reserved water rights are created
by implication when Congress sets aside federal lands other than Native
American reservations. In Federal Power Commission v. Oregon' (Pel-
ton Dam), the Court held that the federal land laws, which had severed
45. Cf. if. at 576.
46. See id. at 568.
47. See id. at 567.




52. Id. at 577.
53. See Baldwin, supra note 21, at 5; Weis, supra note 4, at 131.
54. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
55. See California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 157-58, 163--64.
56. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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water rights from land conveyed to federal patentees, applied only to
public domain lands, not to reserved lands. 7 This meant that state law did
not control the disposition of water on federal reservations. 8
Thirteen years after the Pelton Dam case and fifty-five years after
Winters, the Supreme Court, in Arizona v. California,9 extended the fed-
eral reserved rights doctrine to national recreation areas, national forests,
and wildlife refuges.' Subsequently, the Supreme Court and a number of
lower courts have applied the doctrine to military facilities,' national
monuments,'2 national parks,' subterranean waterholes," and mineral hot
springs.' The cases "put the pieces together into the following rule:"'
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government with-
draws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal
purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water
then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose
of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a reserved
right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reserva-
tion and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation
of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8,
which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Prop-
erty Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of federal
lands. The doctrine applies to [Native American] reservations and
57. See Pelton Dam, 349 U.S. at 444-46. The Court held that the Federal Power Commission
was not required to obtain the consent of the State of Oregon before it permitted a private company
to construct and operate a hydroelectric dam on federal lands, even though, as Justice Douglas noted
in his dissent, the water that would flow through the dam theoretically belonged to the state. See id.
at 452-53 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The decision implied that the licensee was exercising a right of
the federal government to use water reserved at the time the dam site was reserved. See id. at 443-
45; see also 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 213. The Departments of Agriculture and Inte-
rior suspended and subsequently withdrew the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion's decision regarding the
filing of water rights claims for federally designated lands in the National Wilderness Preservation
System. See 58 Fed. Reg. 68,629 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 19,692 (1994).
58. Cf Baldwin, supra note 21, at 5-6.
59. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
60. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601. The Court stated:
The [Water] Master ruled that the principle underlying the reservation of water rights for
[Native American) Reservations was equally applicable to other federal establishments
such as National Recreation Areas and National Forests. We agree with the conclusions
of the Master that the United States intended to reserve water sufficient for the future re-
quirements of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake National Wild-
life Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge and the Gila National Forest.
Id. The Supreme Court considered the question of the extent of the federal reserved water rights for
National Forests in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978).
61. See Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600, 604 (D. Nev. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
62. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976).
63. See United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 30 (Colo. 1982).
64. See Denver, 656 P.2d at 31-32.
65. See id. at 33-34. For a discussion of the application of the reserved rights doctrine to the
various federal land systems, see Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew;
Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1976 BYU L. REv. 639, 641; Targ, supra note
14, at 16-18; Weis, supra note 4, at 130-31.
66. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 6.
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other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable and
nonnavigable streams.67
In sum, the courts recognize that federal reserved water rights may be
inferred from a congressional (or executive) reservation of federal land."
However, simply because Congress has the authority to reserve water
rights for an area set aside for particular purposes does not mean that it,
in fact, has done so.
Four questions arise. The first two are whether Congress's action
with respect to the federal land involved constitutes a "reservation," i.e.,
the dedication of an area of the public domain for specified purposes;'
and if so, whether Congress intended to reserve water rights, either ex-
plicitly or by implication, in the legislation effecting the reservation. In-
tent may be inferred if unappropriated water is necessary to accomplish
the purposes for which the reservation was created.' The third and fourth
questions concern the date on which the reserved rights vest in the
United States, which is generally simultaneous with the reservation of
the land, and the extent of the water rights reserved. The federal reserved
rights doctrine reserves "only that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the [primary] purpose[s] of the reservation, no more."' As the Supreme
Court stated in United States v. New Mexico:
Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a fed-
eral reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the
face of Congress' express deference to state water law in other areas,
that the United States intended to reserve the necessary water. Where
water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, how-
ever, there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, con-
sistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire wa-
ter in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.
67. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138 (citing Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 805 (1976)).
68. In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the State of Arizona argued that an Execu-
tive Order could not reserve water rights. The Court stated:
In our view, these reservations, like those created directly by Congress, were not limited
to land, but included waters as well.... We can give but short shrift at this late date to
the argument that the reservations either of land or water are invalid because they were
originally set apart by the Executive.
Arizona, 373 U.S. at 598.
69. Cf. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 854-55 (discussing the definition of "reserva-
tion" and distinguishing reserved lands from those "withdrawn" from the public domain). For a
discussion of Block and subsequent proceedings, see infra notes 101-57 and accompanying text.
70. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138; see also Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600; Block, 622 F. Supp. at
852-53.
71. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141; see United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,700 (1978).
72. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702. In New Mexico, the Supreme Court ruled that the "outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish" purposes of National Forests identified in
section 528 of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994), are "supple-
mental to" the primary purposes of "improv[ing] and protect[ing] the forest ... securing favorable
[Vol. 76:2
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All four of these questions are raised by the issue of federal reserved
water rights for wilderness. Is wilderness a reservation? Did Congress
intend to give wilderness areas water rights? How much water is set
aside for designated wilderness areas? When do the water rights, if any,
vest?
IV. FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR WILDERNESS
A. The Language and Legislative History of the Wilderness Act
The Wilderness Act is silent concerning water rights reserved for the
wilderness areas designated under its authority. The Act does include
two rather cryptic references to water. The first, section 4(d)(4), provides
for the construction of facilities for water diversion or impoundment
within wilderness areas upon the President's determination that such
development is in the public interest.' It was included in S. 1176, the
1957 version of the Wilderness Bill, ' and has never been used."
The second reference to water, section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act,
states, "Nothing in this [Act] shall constitute an express or implied claim
or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from
State water laws."' 6 Section 4(d)(6) first appeared in 1958 in S. 4028.'
conditions of water flows, and... furnish[ing] a continuous supply of timber" set forth in section
475 of the Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1994). New Mexico, 438 U.S. at
713-14. The Court held that the federal water rights reserved for National Forests are limited to
those required to fulfill the primary purposes. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 712-13, 715. This ruling
prompted Justice Powell to doubt that "the forests which Congress intended to 'improve and protect'
are the still, silent, lifeless places envisioned by the Court." Id. at 719 (Powell, J., dissenting). The
Justice further stated:
In my view, the forests consist of the birds, animals, and fish--the wildlife-that inhabit
them, as well as the trees, flowers, shrubs, and grasses. I therefore would hold that the
United States is entitled to so much water as is necessary to sustain the wildlife of the
forests, as well as the plants.
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
73. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4) (1994). The legislative history of
this section indicates that it was intended to allow "minor water resource conservation measures
[and] small watershed developments." John D. Leshy, Water and Wilderness/Law and Politics, 23
LAND & WATER L. REV. 389, 402 n.53 (1988) (construing 109 CONG. REc. 5892 (1963) (statement
of Sen. Frank Church)).
74. See Patricia Byrnes & Burnita A. Bell, The Wilderness Society and the Wilderness Bill, 58
WILDERNEss 4, 4 (1994). The first wilderness bill was introduced in the Senate on June 7, 1956 by
Sen. Hubert Humphrey. It took eight years, 18 hearings, and some 66 versions of the bill before
Congress approved the Wilderness Act of 1964. See id. at 4; see also ZASLOWSKY, supra note 17, at
218-20 (recounting milestones in wilderness legislation since the Wilderness Act).
75. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 402. The most significant attempt to invoke section 4(d)(4)
occurred when the Denver Water Board sought to build a trans-basin diversion in the Eagle's Nest
Wilderness above Vail, Colorado. See id. at 402 n.54.
76. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(7), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6). This section was originally enacted as
section 4(d)(7). See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 211. The Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1650 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994)), repealed former
item (5) of section 4(d) (having to do with the Boundary Waters Canoe Area), and renumbered the
remaining items. Although the reference to section 4(d)(6) is correct, many commentators, courts,
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The provision was included in the bill to respond to concerns expressed
by the California Department of Water Resources expressed during
hearings on S. 1176 in 1957.8 There is also some indication that the sen-
tence was adapted from proposals made by the United States Forest
Service, 9 which steadfastly opposed wilderness legislation throughout its
eight years of consideration by the Congress.
As initially introduced, the provision stated that nothing in the Wil-
derness Act constituted "an express or implied claim on the part of the
United States for exemption from State water laws."' This was changed
to the final "no claim or denial" language."
Little contemporaneous evidence exists as to the intended meaning
of the new language. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report
on Wilderness Areas and Water Rights reviewed what there is, including
the report of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, which
stated, "Federal-State relationships concerning water laws and wildlife
are maintained without change,"'2 and the comment of Senator Hubert
Humphrey, one of the principal sponsors of the legislation, who said of
the new language:
Paragraph 5, the last in this section, contains language vital to col-
leagues from the West. When the first wilderness bill was being dis-
cussed, some of its opponents charged that its enactment would
change existing water laws and would deprive local communities of
water, both domestic and irrigation. Although this was certainly not
the intention of the sponsors, it has seemed necessary to insert a short
sentence to remove any doubts. 3
and the Solicitor of the United States Department of the Interior refer to it as section 4(d)(7). See
1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 219-31.
77. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 221.
78. See Nat'l Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 1176 Before the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong. 286-87 (1957) [hereinafter S. 1176 Hearings] (statement of
William Berry, Chief of Division of Resources Planning, California Department of Water Re-
sources). Apparently, the California agencies were concerned about the effect of decisions, such as
the Pelton Dam case, on state water law. To address their concerns, the agencies proposed an
amendment to S. 1176 to subject all unappropriated water in wilderness areas to appropriation in
accordance with state law. See id.; see also 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 220-26 (ad-
dressing concerns over the extension of the reserved rights doctrine and its potentially overreaching
effect on state water law); Baldwin, supra note 21, at 30-32 (discussing proposed changes in the bill
by the western states to assure the integrity and maintenance of state water law).
79. Cf S. 1176 Hearings, supra note 78, at 286-87 (1957) (statement of William Berry, Chief
of Div. of Resources Planning, Cal. Dep't of Water Resources).
80. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 32.
81. See id. at 32-33; see also 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 224; infra text accom-
panying notes 164-73.
82. See Baldwin, supra note 21, at 28-29 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 87-2521, at 27 (1962)).




Based on an extensive examination of other legislative history of the
Wilderness Act, the CRS concluded that the most probable interpretation
of section 4(d)(6) is that the Wilderness Act is not meant to change ex-
isting state water law, but to acknowledge the existence of both federal
and state water rights." Indeed, the federal government read the section
this way until 1988, when the Interior Department Solicitor issued his
Opinion interpreting the section as expressly disclaiming the creation of
water rights for wilderness."
Although the meaning of section 4(d)(6) is subject to conflicting
interpretations, Congress later used the same language in the National
Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 19666 and the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act of 1968. ' The Refuge System Act does not explain the
provision, and the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California held that fed-
eral reserved water rights exist for National Wildlife Refuges, without
referring to section 4(d)(6)."
Many of the key proponents of the Wilderness Act, including
Senators Humphrey and Kuchel, sponsored the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act of 1968.' In contrast to the Wilderness Act, the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act expressly reserves water rights sufficient to fulfill the pur-
poses of the Act.' It also includes the "neither claim or denial" language
used in the Wilderness Act.9 These facts led the CRS to conclude that the
language indicated Congress's intent to preserve the status quo of water
law, which recognizes both federal reserved and state appropriated water
rights.' Under the status quo, neither the Wilderness Act nor the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act would affect valid existing water rights perfected
under state law or prevent future appropriations unless they impaired
statutory purposes or the administration of the federal statute."
84. See id. at 35.
85. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 213. For discussion of the Solicitor's Opin-
ion, see infra Part V.
86. See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(i) (1994).
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b) (1994).
88. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). In United States v. Vesterso, 828
F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1987), the Eighth Circuit interpreted the claim or denial language as used in the
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act. The court said that the purpose of the provi-
sion was to maintain federal-state relationships concerning water laws without change, to prevent a
general preemption of state water laws as they affected federal easements. See Vesterso, 828 F.2d at
1240. The Vesterso court cited Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985), with ap-
proval. See Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1240.
89. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1994); see Baldwin, supra note 21, at 38.
90. See 16 U.S.C. § 1284(c).
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B. Judicial Consideration of Wilderness Federal Reserved Water Rights
For more than twenty years, the general assumption was that wilder-
ness, like other federal land systems, had federal reserved water rights.
The System grew steadily from its birth weight of 9.1 million acres in
1964, with the addition of new areas within national forests, national
parks, and national wildlife refuges." (The Bureau of Land Management
did not receive a wilderness mandate until the enactment of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,"' and has moved with glacial
speed since that time to evaluate and recommend areas for wilderness
designation.) Between 1964 and 1988, virtually all of the bills creating
wilderness areas said nothing about water rights. A few bills repeated the
language of section 4(d)(6)."
In 1979, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior analyzed the
nature and extent of federal reserved water rights for several federal land
systems, including wilderness. 7 After reviewing the legislative purposes
of "preserving and protecting wilderness in its natural condition without
permanent improvements or human habitation, to fulfill public purposes
of recreation, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historic
use, ' the Solicitor's Opinion concluded that "formally designated wil-
derness areas receive reserved water rights necessary to accomplish these
purposes." Subsequent Solicitors modified this Opinion, but the section
on wilderness was unchanged until 1988."
No court considered the issue of whether designated wilderness has
federal reserved water rights until 1985, when the Sierra Club sued the
United States Forest Service for its failure to claim federal reserved wa-
ter rights for Colorado wilderness areas. In Sierra Club v. Block,'' the
Sierra Club sought a judicial determination that wilderness areas have
reserved rights and that the federal agencies charged with management
responsibility for these areas are obligated to protect them.'"
94. See Margaret Shulenberger, Annotation, Construction and Application of Wilderness Act
(16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131 et seq.) Providing for National Wilderness Preservation System, 14 A.L.R.
FED. 508 nn.5-6 (1973).
95. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 603,43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994).
96. See Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-406, § 101(e)(1), 98 Stat. 1485,
1488; California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, § 304(h), 98 Stat. 1619, 1624 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 543c(h) (1994)).
97. See 1979 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 2, at 553.
98. Id. at 609 & n.104.
99. Id. at 609-10.
100. See CoGGINs, supra note 11, at 386-87, 397.
101. 622 F. Supp. 842,846 (D. Colo. 1985).
102. See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 846. To date, the only other case to consider whether federal
agencies have a duty to protect federal reserved water rights is Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp.
443, 451-52 (D.D.C. 1980), affd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The court concluded that federal agencies have discretion to use whatever methods they choose to
protect wilderness water. See Andrus, 487 F. Supp. at 448.
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As John Leshy observed, the controversy began modestly enough. 3
The states had won "[a] series of bruising battles over the extent to which
the state courts could adjudicate federal Winters rights," and now had the
opportunity in general stream adjudications to quantify the federal right
and fold it into the state water rights system. " In Colorado, the Forest
Service, faced with a deadline to file water rights claims in a stream ad-
judication, refused to assert federal reserved rights for the wilderness
areas affected by the adjudication."3 According to Leshy, the federal
government decided "to relinquish its claim to a valuable property right
by not asserting it in the adjudication. The Sierra Club sued, and the fun
began., ,'6
The defendant-intervenors in the case argued that the Wilderness Act
does not reserve lands. 7 Rather, it reclassifies previously withdrawn and
reserved lands and, therefore, wilderness areas are limited to the water
rights set aside for the land system from which they are created."' The
Wilderness Act is simply a "set of statutory land management direc-
tives.' ' Wilderness purposes are secondary, claimed the defendant-
intervenors, and Congress did not intend to reserve additional water
rights for them."
The defendant-intervenors based much of their argument on the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. New Mexico."' In New Mex-
ico, the Supreme Court held that the additional purposes created by the
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSY)"' for national forests
were supplemental to the primary purposes for which forests were re-
served under the Forest Service Organic Act,"3 and, therefore, did not
provide additional water rights."'
The Block court rejected this argument, based on the language and
legislative history of the Wilderness Act."' The court stated that, al-
though wilderness designation was not the original withdrawal and res-
ervation from the public domain, it does not follow that wilderness is not
withdrawn and reserved."6 In particular, the court noted that wilderness
103. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 392.
104. Id.; see supra note 38 (explaining general stream adjudications).
105. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 392.
106. Id.
107. See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 851.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 855.
110. See id. at 859.
111. 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978).
112. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
113. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551 (1994).
114. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715.
115. See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 855-58.
116. See id. at 857-58. Wilderness areas are created from lands in national forests, national
parks, national wildlife refuges, as well as public domain lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Land Management. See id. at 858.
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areas established pursuant to the Act are withdrawn from use-related
laws that permit activities inconsistent with the preservation of wilder-
ness qualities, and are dedicated for particular federal purposes" 7 These
purposes include their "preservation and protection in their natural con-
dition... to secure for the American people of present and future gen-
erations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness.""8 The legis-
lative history of the Wilderness Act, said the court, reveals that the crea-
tion of a National Wilderness Preservation System was "foremost in the
minds of the members of Congress.""' 9 The court distinguished the Su-
preme Court's analysis of MUSY in New Mexico, ruling that the Wilder-
ness Act does not "constitute an attempt to add to the primary purposes
of existing reservations," but is instead "initial legislation creating an
entirely new reservation of federal lands.' '
After finding that the Wilderness Act effected a withdrawal and res-
ervation of water rights, the court considered the question of whether
Congress intended to reserve unappropriated water for those areas. It
relied on the Supreme Court's rulings in Cappaert and New Mexico that
intent to reserve water rights may be inferred if unappropriated water is
necessary to accomplish the primary purposes for which the reservation
was created.'2' To determine the primary purposes of wilderness, the
court carefully reviewed the statements of purpose contained in the Wil-
derness Act that "wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public pur-
poses of recreation, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and
historical use."'" The court also cited the remarks of various members of
Congress that "the primary motivation of Congress in establishing the
wilderness preservation system was to 'guarantee[] that these lands will
be kept in their original untouched natural state.""'  The court deter-
mined that, unlike MUSY, all of the purposes expressed in the Wilder-
ness Act are primary." Congress, therefore, reserved sufficient water to
fulfill all of them.'" The court emphasized that "water is the lifeblood of
the wilderness areas. Without water, the wilderness would become de-
serted wastelands [and] ... the very purposes for which the Wilderness
Act was established would be entirely defeated. Clearly, this result was
not intended by Congress."'"
Although the court ruled that Congress reserved water rights by wil-
derness designation, it did not find the agency's failure to claim the
117. See id.
118. Id. at 850 (quoting Wilderness Act § 4(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (1994)).
119. ld. at 858.
120. Id. at 860.
121. See id. at 853.
122. Id. at 858 (quoting Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b)).
123. Id. at 850 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 17,448 (1964) (statement of Rep. Cleveland)).





rights to be arbitrary and capricious." Instead, it held that federal agen-
cies have a duty to protect the water resources of wilderness areas, but no
specific statutory obligation to claim federal reserved water rights."
These [Wilderness Act] mandates evince Congress' intent to impose a
duty on the administering agencies to protect and preserve all wilder-
ness resources, including water. Thus, there is a general duty under
the Wilderness Act to protect and preserve wilderness water re-
sources. There is, however, no specific statutory duty to claim re-
served water rights in the wilderness areas even though Congress im-
pliedly reserved such rights in order to effectuate the purposes of the
Act.... [RIeserved water rights is only one of several tools available
to federal defendants to meet their statutory duty to protect and pre-
serve wilderness water resources. '
The government argued that it had alternative ways to protect wilderness
water and did not need to claim federal reserved rights. The court found
the record on these alternative approaches inadequate and remanded the
matter to the Forest Service to prepare a more definite statement of the
agency's plans to protect water in Colorado's wilderness in light of the
ruling that the Wilderness Act reserved water rights.'
Addressing the government's subsequent appeal in Sierra Club v.
Lyng,'3' the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case
because the Forest Service had not prepared its plan and, consequently,
the district court's order was not final and reviewable.' 32
In November of 1986, the Forest Service submitted its report.'3 3 Two
months later, the Sierra Club filed a second lawsuit challenging the suffi-
ciency of the agency's plan for protecting wilderness water in
Colorado.'" The district court reiterated its earlier holding that "federal
127. See id. at 864-65.
128. See id. at 864.
129. Id. at 864-65. The court in Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 448 (D.D.C. 1980),
reached the same conclusion with respect to the protection of water resources for national parks and
recreation areas. At least two commentators argue that the court was mistaken in holding that federal
agencies have discretion to use whatever methods they choose to protect wilderness water. See
Robert H. Abrams, Water in the Western Wilderness: The Duty to Assert Reserved Water Rights,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 395-99 (1986); Jason Marks, Comment, The Duty of Agencies to Assert
Reserved Water Rights in Wilderness Areas, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639, 659 (1987). They also maintain
that both the doctrine of federal reserved water rights and the Wilderness Act indicate that agencies
have an obligation to protect water rights as well as water flows. See Abrams, supra, at 396-99;
Marks, supra, at 659. Only Congress has the authority to designate a wilderness. When it does so,
under the doctrine of federal reserved water rights, it also reserves the water rights necessary to
fulfill the purposes of the reservation. See id. at 639. Reserved water rights are not just one technique
available to the agency; they are the mechanism chosen by Congress. Federal agencies lack discre-
tion to ignore Congress's action. See id. at 655-659, 661.
130, See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 865.
131. 661 F. Supp. 1490, 1492 (D. Colo. 1987).
132. See Lyng, 661 F. Supp at 1492.
133. Seeid.
134. See id. at 1490.
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reserved water rights do exist in previously unappropriated water" in
wilderness areas designated pursuant to the Wilderness Act."' It then
turned to the plan and concluded that the alternatives suggested by the
agency "present[ed] an abuse of discretion under 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A)."'" The court found the Forest Service's plan was "woefully
inadequate and constitute[d] an insouciant disregard of the government's
statutory responsibility to protect wilderness area federal reserved water
rights.'"" It rejected the plan and ordered the Forest Service to try
again.' 8 In doing so, the court recognized that a political agenda was
clearly at work:
[T]he issues in this case are permeated with conflicting philosophical
views and economic interests which properly should be resolved by
the political branches of government.... [However, u]ntil enlight-
ened by a more precise articulation of legislative policy, it is my intent
to enforce with vigor the intent of Congress as I perceive it to be.'"
In the second round of this litigation, the court addressed a new
claim advanced by the defendant-intervenors that the legislative history
of section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act (the "neither claim or denial"
provision) indicated that Congress did not intend to create any new fed-
eral water rights which would interfere with water development by the
states."' The federal government disagreed with the defendant-
intervenors, asserting that section 4(d)(6) and its legislative history re-
flected Congress's intent to be "neutral" on the question of federal re-
served water rights and existing state water law.'
The court declined to "delve into the labyrinthine complexities" of
the parties' arguments and relied instead on the "plain reading" of the
section. 2 The court decided that section 4(d)(6) is "simply a disclaimer,"
expressing Congress's wish to "maintain the status quo of basic water
law.' 41 3 Rather than bolster the intervenors' arguments, said the court, the
section negated them because it does not work any substantive change in
135. Id. at 1492 (quoting Block, 622 F. Supp. at 862).
136. Id. at 1501.
137. Id.
138. A more detailed second report was filed, which again concluded that water for wilderness
could be protected without claiming federal reserved rights. See COGGINs, supra note 11, at 397.
"The Sierra Club did not challenge the substance of this report and the district court entered a final
judgment simply declaring that the Wilderness Act reserved water rights under the Winters Doc-
trine." l; cf Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1422 (10th Cir. 1990) (repudiating the govern-
ment's contention that Forest Service inaction could not be adjudicated in federal court).
139. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1502.
140. See id. at 1492-93.





the rights parties may acquire under the various doctrines of water law,
including the reserved rights doctrine.'"
Again the federal government appealed. This time the Tenth Circuit
vacated the judgment below on the grounds that the case was not ripe for
review. 5 The court of appeals held that the district court erred in grant-
ing a declaratory judgment that the Wilderness Act created federal re-
served water rights.'" The Sierra Club had not established actual or im-
minent harm to any wilderness areas from the agency's failure to claim
water rights, and consequently, the Club's claim for judicial review was
"speculative and contingent."'"
The appellate court did confirm that the Wilderness Act imposes on
federal agencies an affirmative duty to administer wilderness areas so as
to "preserve [their] wilderness character."'4 8 If the Forest Service had
permitted strip mining, road construction, or other activities directly in-
consistent with the Wilderness Act, the court said, it could review that
action.' 9 Otherwise, except in those circumstances where an agency's
action cannot be reconciled with the Act's mandate to preserve the char-
acter of a wilderness area, an agency's decision to use or not to use fed-
eral reserved water rights, allegedly created by the Wilderness Act, is
committed to agency discretion by law."
The Congressional Research Service prepared a detailed analysis of
the Tenth Circuit's opinion.' Its report pointed out that the court of ap-
peals had overlooked the fact that the United States was at the time
joined in Colorado water proceedings, which the Supreme Court has
found to be appropriate for the adjudication of federal reserved water
rights.'52 These proceedings determine the legal rights and priorities of all
persons, including the United States, along various water courses. The
Supreme Court has held that the judgments resulting from these pro-
ceedings are final and binding on the United States.' 3 Thus, the failure of
the Forest Service to claim federal reserved water rights in the adjudica-
tion could result in the impairment or even permanent loss of water
rights. The CRS report stated, "[Q]uite arguably, agency officials would
have a duty to claim federal rights in general water adjudications when
144. See id. at 1494.
145. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1419 (10th Cir. 1990).
146. See Yeutter, 911 F.2dat 1421.
147. id.
148. Id. at 1413 (quoting Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1994)).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1414.
151. See P. Baldwin, Memorandum from American Law Division on Analysis and Implications
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failing to do so would be the equivalent of disposing of the property in-
terests of the United States."'5'
The response to the Sierra Club litigation was swift. The Solicitor
of the Department of the Interior prepared an Opinion repudiating the
whole concept of a wilderness water right.5 On Capitol Hill, Senator
Armstrong of Colorado introduced an amendment to a Colorado wilder-
ness bill that expressly renounced any Winters water right claim, not only
for the areas that the bill would designate, but for areas designated by
previous acts, dating back to 1964.'" When environmentalists opposed
the amendment, Senator Armstrong withdrew his support for the bill as a
whole, and it died.' 7 The Senator's actions set the tone for congressional
debate over water and wilderness for the next several years.
V. THE SOLICITOR'S OPINION OF 1988
In an Opinion, dated July 26, 1988, the Solicitor of the Interior De-
partment decided, "[o]n the basis of a detailed examination of the Wil-
derness Act and its legislative history," that Congress did not intend to
reserve water rights when it provided for the designation of wilderness
areas." This Opinion superseded the 1979 Opinion. It also represented a
reversal of the position taken by the federal government in Sierra Club v.
Lyng'5 ' that section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act reflected Congress's
intent to be "neutral" on the issue of federal reserved water rights and
state water law."w The Solicitor concluded that wilderness is not a pri-
mary reservation;'" wilderness designation simply imposes certain man-
agement restrictions on existing federal reservations." The Solicitor de-
termined that Congress meant wilderness purposes to be secondary to the
purposes of the underlying reservations from which wilderness areas are
created."
The Solicitor interpreted section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act
(which the Opinion refers to as section 4(d)(7))' as specifically dis-
154. Id. For a thorough discussion of the issue of agency discretion not to claim water rights,
see Marks, supra note 129, at 655-59.
155. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 213.
156. See Weis, supra note 4, at 145-46. Section 7 of this proposal stated:
No provisions of this Act nor any other Act of Congress designating areas in Colorado as
part of the National Wilderness Preservation System, nor any guidelines, rules, or regula-
tions issued thereunder, shall constitute the establishment of a right to the use or flow of
water in the Federal Government because of the designation....
S. 2916, 98th Cong. § 7 (1984).
157. See Weis, supra note 4, at 145-46.
158. 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 213.
159. 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987).
160. See Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1493.
161. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 218.
162. See id. at 224.
163. See id. at 234-36.
164. See supra note 76 (explaining the numbering of sections).
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claiming the creation of new water rights, while preserving existing fed-
eral reserved water rights for Native American reservations, national
forests, and national parks.'" According to the Solicitor, the "no express
or implied claim" language of section 4(d)(6) was meant to "alleviate the
concerns of western states" following the Pelton Dam decision holding
that the Wilderness Act would provide the basis for the assertion of ad-
ditional federal reserved water rights.'" In support of his analysis, the
Solicitor referred to various portions of the legislative history, particu-
larly the testimony of the California State Water Resources Department
and the statement of Senator Hubert Humphrey, discussed previously.'67
The Solicitor stressed that while section 4(d)(6) disclaimed the
creation of any new or additional reserved water rights, it retained exist-
ing federal reserved water rights.'" Congress added the "no denial" clause
to the statutory provision "to safeguard federal reserved water rights then
existing for park, forest and [Native American] purposes."'" The "no
denial" language, said the Solicitor, recognized that wilderness preserva-
tion is one part of the programs carried out in national parks, national
forests and Native American reservations, on which federal reserved
rights already exist.70
To confirm his reading of section 4(d)(6), the Solicitor referred to
the State of California's proposal to disclaim in the Wilderness Act all
federal exemptions from state law. Senate bill S. 1176 included Califor-
nia's recommended language in 1957, but subsequently modified the
language by the addition of the "no denial" phrase.'7' Since there is little
Wilderness Act legislative history to explain the reasons the phrase was
added, the Solicitor looked to parallel legislative history of the same lan-
guage used in a bill to overturn the Pelton Dam case." This bill was
heard by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the same
committee that would begin to consider wilderness bills two years later."
California had suggested the following provision be included in the bill
to overturn the Pelton Dam decision:
Subject to existing rights under State law, all navigable and nonnavi-
gable waters are hereby reserved for appropriation and use of the
public pursuant to State law, and rights to the use of such waters for
beneficial purposes shall be acquired under State laws relating to the
appropriation, control, use and distribution of such waters. 74
165. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 219, 223-24.
166. Id. at 219, 222.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 77-85.
168. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 223.
169. Id. at 224.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 224-25.
173. See id. at 220.
174. Id. at 225 (quoting The Water Rights Settlement Act, S. 863, 84th Cong. § 6 (1956)).
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The Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel criti-
cized this language as being overbroad and exposing the United States to
the potential loss of vested water rights on federal lands. "' The Solicitor
stated that it was the "fear" of losing federal reserved water rights that
prompted the Committee to substitute the "no claim or denial" language
for California's "subject to existing rights" limitation, not the desire to
extend the reserved rights doctrine to wilderness. The Solicitor asserted
that "[o]nly if this interpretation of section 4(d)(7) is accepted ... do
subsequent descriptions of 4(d)(7) as a 'disclaimer of any interference
with State or Federal water rights' make sense."'"
As noted above, the Solicitor also insisted that Congress did not
specify preservation of wilderness as the primary purpose of the federal
lands in which wilderness areas are designated. The Solicitor relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. New Mexico, which
distinguished between primary and secondary purposes of national for-
ests in determining the extent of federal reserved water rights created by
the reservations." Section 4(a) of the Wilderness Act, he said, "assigns
wilderness purposes a secondary role to other purposes for which the
lands are administered."'"9 The section states, "The purposes of this
chapter are hereby declared to be within and supplemental to the pur-
poses for which national forests and units of the national park and na-
tional wildlife refuge systems are established and administered. . . ."" In
addition, the Wilderness Act specifies that it is not meant to interfere
with the purposes for which national forests are established or to lower
the standards for the use and preservation of the National Park System
units."' As a consequence of these provisions, and in accord with the
Supreme Court's decision in New Mexico, the Solicitor concluded "there
is no implication that water has been reserved for these secondary
uses."
182
The Solicitor spent appreciable time in his Opinion refuting the
three principal arguments against his conclusion that section 4(d)(6) dis-
claims federal water rights.' 3 These arguments are that (1) the language
preserves the status quo of the relationship between federal and state
water rights; (2) the provision represents a congressional compromise on
the construction of water projects in wilderness areas; and (3) the use of
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 225-26 (quoting the legislative hearings associated with S. 174).
178. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978); see also supra notes 111-14
and accompanying text.
179. 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 235.
180. Wilderness Act § 4(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (1994).
181. See Wilderness Act § 4(a)(1), (3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a)(1), (3); see also 1988 Solicitor's
Opinion, supra note 3, at 236.
182. 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 236.
183. See id. at 227-34.
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the same "no claim or denial" language in the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act proves that Congress did not mean to deprive wilderness of reserved
water rights.'
According to the Solicitor, the theory that section 4(d)(6) maintains
congressional neutrality concerning the doctrine of federal reserved wa-
ter rights, doing nothing more than preserving the status quo, would ren-
der the provision essentially meaningless, violating the principle of
statutory construction that legislative provisions are not to be interpreted
as surplusage. The Solicitor disputed that Congress would have added
the "no denial" language simply to negate the "no express or implied
claim" language.'" Rather, Congress added the "no denial" phrase to
prevent misinterpretation of the "no claim" language.'87 Furthermore, at
the time the language was drafted, Congress was considering legislation
to overturn the Pelton Dam case.'88 As a consequence, said the Solicitor,
it is unlikely that Congress wanted to maintain a status quo that included
expanded federal reserved water rights.'"
The Solicitor found the second argument, that section 4(d)(6) repre-
sents an agreement that Congress would negate the guarantee of state
water rights in exchange for protection of access for water projects, un-
supported by the legislative history of the Wilderness Act, and inconsis-
tent with the subsequent course of the wilderness bills." According to
the Solicitor, if such a compromise had been reached, the proponents of
water rights would have ceased opposing the bill and those not party to
the compromise would have opposed the "sacrifice" of their guaranteed
water rights.'9'
On the third argument, that the language used in 4(d)(6) is exactly
the same as in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, which does reserve water
rights, the Solicitor had two responses. The first was that Congress may
use the same language to mean different things in different statutes, and
the views of a subsequent Congress afford no basis for inferring the pur-
poses of an earlier Congress." His more substantive response was that,
although the "wording employed in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and
the Wilderness Act is the same, the statutory context and stated legisla-
tive purpose are in sharp contrast."'"3 The "claim or denial" language
appears in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act in a subsection entitled
184. Cf id
185. See id. at 227.




190. See id. at 230-32.
191. Id. at 231.
192. See id. at 232.
193. Id.
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"Compensation for Water Rights."'' " The purpose of this section, ac-
cording to the Solicitor, is to ensure that vested water rights are not taken
without compensation. " Based on the legislative history of the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, the Solicitor determined that Congress added the "no
claim or denial" language "to prevent the reserved water rights created in
the Act from eliminating existing rights under state laws that were being
taken and which formed the basis for compensation."''
VI. THE AFTERMATH OF THE SoLIcrrOR'S OPINION
Many of the responses to the Solicitor's interpretation of the Wil-
derness Act have already been considered in the review of the Sierra
Club v. Block and Sierra Club v. Lyng decisions, and in the CRS analysis
of the Opinion. As noted, the Solicitor's Opinion conflicted with the
court's conclusions on the application of the reserved rights doctrine,
whether wilderness is a primary reservation of lands, and the meaning of
section 4(d)(6). It also conflicted with the CRS's evaluation of the Wil-
derness Act's legislative history, and the use of identical language in the
National Wildlife Refuge Act and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Fi-
nally, it conflicted with ninety years of judicial interpretation of the
Winters Doctrine.
Although the Opinion was withdrawn in 1994, its issuance in 1988
had an immediate impact on the management of wilderness by federal
agencies, and on the wilderness debate in Congress. Two days after the
Opinion was released, then Attorney General Meese advised Secretary of
the Interior Hodel that he agreed that the Opinion "properly finds that no
legally sufficient basis exists for an implication of federal reserved water
rights for wilderness purposes."'" Attorney General Meese directed fed-
eral agencies not to claim federal reserved water rights for wilderness in
pending general stream adjudications, but to seek water for wilderness
purposes, where appropriate, under state law.'"
After Attorney General Meese left office, the Sierra Club Legal De-
fense Fund (SCLDF), on behalf of the Sierra Club and The Wilderness
Society, requested Attorney General Thornburgh to reconsider the Meese
decision.'" The general stream adjudication for the Virgin River in Utah
194. 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b) (1994).
195. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 232-33.
196. Id. at 233.
197. Letter from Edwin Meese, Attorney General of the United States, to the Honorable Donald
P. Hodel 1 (July 28, 1988)) (on file with author).
198. See id. Attorney General Meese stated: "Accordingly, in the absence of express statutory
language, we will not assert reserved wilderness water rights under federal law in any further litiga-
tion on behalf of the United States, but will seek water for wilderness purposes where appropriate
under states law." Id.
199. See Letter from Laurens Silver, Esq., Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, to the Honorable
Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General of the United States 2 (Sept. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Silver Letter]
(on file with author).
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was pending at the time and the United States was faced with a deadline
for claiming water rights for the Beaver Dam Mountains Wilderness,' °
which Congress designated in the Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984.2
SCLDF expressed concern that the failure of the United States to assert
water rights for the wilderness would result in the loss of these rights in
the adjudication process.' Since the Beaver Dam Wilderness Area was a
mid-stream and not a headwaters wilderness, the failure of the United
States to claim water rights might have resulted in a lack of water for the
entire area if upstream appropriation occurred. 3
Attorney General Thornburgh did not reverse Attorney General
Meese's position concerning the duty of federal agencies to claim water
rights for wilderness in state proceedings, and it continued to be the pol-
icy of the United States for the next five years.' No water rights were
asserted for the Beaver Dam Wilderness in the adjudication of the Virgin
River.'
The Solicitor's Opinion presented the environmental community
with a significant dilemma: whether to insist that the Opinion was incor-
rect and that the Winters Doctrine assured water rights for wilderness, or
to push for the express reservation of water rights in wilderness bills un-
der consideration by the Congress. Both choices were risky. Silence in a
wilderness bill carried the risk that areas designated would be determined
subsequently to have no water rights. An express reservation of water
rights carried the risk that any wilderness legislation without water rights
language would be read as disclaiming water rights for the areas estab-
lished. Since a significant portion of the National Wilderness Preserva-
tion System was created by the Wilderness Act of 1964 and other legis-
lation without express water rights language, the consequences of the
first choice initially appeared to be greater than those that might follow
an express reservation.'
Members of the 100th Congress tried a number of approaches to
water rights language, some with greater success than others. For exam-
ple, after Senator Armstrong's bill died, Senator Timothy Wirth and
Congressman Michael Strang attempted to develop a wilderness bill for
200. See id.
201. Pub. L. No. 98-406, 98 Stat. 1485, 1492.
202. See Silver Letter, supra note 199, at 3.
203. Cf id.
204. The Federal Register notice announcing the withdrawal of the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion
stated that the Attorney General's concurrence in it was withdrawn as well. See Water Rights Under
the Wilderness Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,692, 19,692 (1994).
205. See Interview with K Jack Haugrud, Assistant Chief, General Legislation Section, Envi-
ronment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice (Oct. 13, 1998)
(hereinafter Haugrud Interview].
206. See Letter from Representatives of The Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, and the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation to Jim Martin, State Director, Office of Sen. Timothy Wirth of Colorado
1-3 (Jan. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Wilderness Society Letter] (on file with author).
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Colorado, using two different strategies for water rights.' Senator
Wirth's bill was silent as to federal reserved water rights; Congressman
Strang's bill directed the Secretary of the Interior to claim minimum in-
stream flows for wilderness areas, pursuant to Colorado law, which per-
mits instream appropriations to "preserve the natural environment to a
reasonable degree."'a However, "Congressman Strang's bill did not use
the language of the Colorado instream statute, but instead [proposed to
limit] federal water appropriations to the minimum amount necessary to
preserve 'aquatic life to a reasonable degree."'" The bill also prohibited
federal water appropriations during "drought events."2 "0 Environmental-
ists opposed both the Wirth and the Strang bills as offering insufficient
protection for wilderness qualities and stream flows.2" No wilderness
legislation was enacted for Colorado until 1993."'
The fight over water rights for wilderness convinced the environ-
mental community that silence was no longer golden. Environmental
groups like the Sierra Club and The Wilderness Society worked to per-
suade members of Congress of the need to expressly preserve water
rights in legislation creating federal reservations. Water language became
as big a battleground as acreage and areas, not just for wilderness, but for
national reserves, monuments, national conservation areas, and other
federal land designations. Although the adopted language varied, no bill
claimed that wilderness was not a reservation or stated that wilderness
had no rights to water. The bills that did deny federal reserved water
rights indicated that the use of such rights was not necessary to protect
the wilderness qualities of the designated areas."3
For example, Congress denied the reservation of water rights in the
legislation creating the Hagerman Fossil Beds National Monument and
the City of Rocks National Reserve, but tied the denial to the "unique
circumstances with respect to the water" found in these areas."' Specifi-
cally, Congress determined that there were no resources in the areas re-
quiring the protection of a federal reserved water right. The legislative
language for the Hagerman Fossil Beds Monument reads:
207. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 413-14 nn.93-97; Weis, supra note 4, at 146-48.
208. Weis, supra note 4, at 147 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973)).
209. Id. (quoting H.R. 4233,99th Cong. § 2 (1986)).
210. Id.
211. See id. at 146-47.
212. Cf. Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-77, 107 Stat. 756.
213. The Congressional Research Service and Debbie Sease, Legislative Director of the Sierra
Club, documented the water rights formulations used in the 100th Congress. See Pamela Baldwin,
Express Language on Federal Water Rights in the 100th Congress, Cong. Research Serv. 1, 1 (Feb.
7, 1989) [hereinafter Baldwin, Express Language]; Memorandum from Debbie Sease, Legislative
Director, Sierra Club, to Water List on Water Rights Language (Jan. 26, 1989) (on file with author)
(discussing the legislative language on water rights existing at the time).
214. Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-696, §§ 202(0, 304, 102 Stat.
4571, 4575-76; see Baldwin, Express Language, supra note 213, at 8.
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Congress finds that there are unique circumstances with respect to the
water or water-related resources within the Monument designated by
this title. The Congress recognizes that there is little or no water or
water-related resources that require the protection of a federal reserve
water right. Nothing in this title, nor any action taken pursuant
thereto, shall constitute either an exressed or implied reservation of
water or water right for any purpose.
Congress seemed most comfortable with an express reservation of
some, but not all of the unappropriated water available in the areas des-
ignated. Section 502 of the Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988, for
example, stated "[s]ubject to valid existing rights, within the areas desig-
nated as wilderness by this Act, Congress hereby expressly reserves such
water rights as necessary, for the purposes for which such areas are so
designated.""2 ' This language modified the original language of S. 2165,
which called for the reservation of all the unappropriated water in the




In section 509 of the El Malpais National Monument, New Mex-
ico-Establishment bill,"8 Congress limited the amount of water rights
reserved to the "minimum" necessary to carry out the reservations' pur-
poses, protected valid existing rights, and declared that it did not intend
to set a precedent for future designations or to affect the interpretation of
any other statute:
(a) Congress expressly reserves to the United States the minimum
amount of water required to carry out the purposes for which the na-
tional monument, the conservation area, and the wilderness areas are
designated under this Act....
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect any existing valid or vested
water right, or applications for water rights which are pending as of
the date of enactment of this Act and which are subsequently granted
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as establishing a prece-
dent with regard to any future designations, nor shall it affect the in-
terpretation of any other Act or any designation made pursuant
thereto.2 9
The environmental community regarded the El Malpais language as a
reasonably good approach.2" The express reservation of water rights as-
215. Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act § 304, 102 Stat. at 4576. The City of Rocks National
Reserve used the same approach, and virtually the same language. See id. § 202(0, 102 Stat. at 4575;
see also Baldwin, Express Language, supra note 213, at 8-9.
216. Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-668, § 502, 102 Stat. 3961, 3968.
217. See Baldwin, Express Language, supra note 213, at 4.
218. Pub. L. No. 100-225, § 509, 101 Stat. 1539, 1549 (1987).
219. Id. § 509(a)-(c), 101 Stat. at 1549.
220. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 415-17. Leshy disagreed with this assessment, calling the El
Malpais language "not a terrible result.... [but]... far from ideal." Id. at 417.
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sured that such rights were set aside for the areas subject to the legisla-
tion. The statement concerning precedent and interpretation left in place
the argument that the Winters Doctrine applied to all wilderness legisla-
tion containing no express reservation of water. The drawbacks to the El
Malpais formula were that only a minimum amount of water was re-
served and protection was extended to pending applications for water
rights, as well as vested rights, considerably expanding the category of
rights with priority over those of the federal reservations."
A number of wilderness bills not only reserved water rights but di-
rected the Secretary of the appropriate federal agency to file claims for
their quantification in an appropriate stream adjudication. This congres-
sional instruction conflicted with Attorney General Meese's order to the
federal agencies not to claim federal reserved water rights in stream ad-
judications.
The Nevada Wilderness Protection Act of 1989,2 for example, re-
served "a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the wil-
derness areas created by this Act ' and commanded the Secretary to
"file a claim for the quantification of the water rights reserved ... in an
appropriate stream adjudication." The United States subsequently filed
claims for all the unappropriated water flows in the wilderness areas cre-
ated by the Act.'
By 1991, the environmental community had decided it was time to
draft "model" water rights language in order to avoid the further prolif-
eration of water rights provisions in wilderness bills. 6 The community
had the help of some of the premier water lawyers in the country, in-
cluding Charles ("Barney") White, Lori Potter, and David Getches.2' The
three basic concepts in the model language were: (1) an express reserva-
tion of, if not full flows, at least sufficient water to fulfill all the purposes
of the reservation; (2) a statement of congressional intent either not to
deny the existence of Winters Doctrine water rights for lands designated
in other legislation or not to imply any interpretation about prior or future
wilderness bills, and (3) a directive to federal agencies to take steps to
protect water rights in appropriate state adjudication!'
221. Seeid. at416.
222. Pub. L. No. 101-195, 103 Stat. 1784.
223. Id. § 8(a), 103 Stat. at 1788.
224. Id. § 8(c), 103 Stat. at 1788.
225. See Haugrud Interview, supra note 205.
226. See Sease & Green Memorandum, supra note 8; Wilderness Society Letter, supra note
206, at 3.
227. Cf Wilderness Society Letter, supra note 206, at 3-4.
228. Cf Sease & Green Memorandum, supra note 8, at 2; Wilderness Society Letter, supra
note 206, at 3.
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The language used in the Arizona Wilderness Act of 19902 came
very close to the model, and was supported by the environmental com-
munity for use in a number of state bills, including Montana, California,
Colorado, and Utah. ' The Act's language reads:
WATER--(1) With respect to each wilderness area designated by this
title, Congress hereby reserves a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill
the purposes of this title. The priority date of such reserved rights
shall be the date of enactment of this Act.
(2) The Secretary and all other officers of the United States shall take
steps necessary to protect the rights reserved by paragraph (1), in-
cluding the filing by the Secretary of a claim for the quantification of
such rights in any present or future appropriate stream adjudication in
the courts of the State of Arizona in which the United States is or may
be joined and which is conducted in accordance with the McCarran
Amendment (43 U.S.C. § 666).
(3) Nothing in this title shall be construed as a relinquishment or re-
duction of any water rights reserved or appropriated by the United
States in the State of Arizona on or before the date of enactment of
this Act.
(4) The Federal water rights reserved by this title are specific to the
wilderness areas located in the State of Arizona designated by this ti-
tle. Nothing in this title related to reserved Federal water rights shall
be construed as establishing a precedent with regard to any future
designations, nor shall it constitute an interpretation of any other Act
or any designation made pursuant thereto.3'
After the furor of 1987-1991, the controversy over wilderness and
water rights died away. The Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993' was the
last major legislative fight. The water rights formulation included in this
Act is unlike any other. The Act does not deny the existence of federal
reserved water rights for wilderness, but expressly disclaimed the need to
use them to protect the wilderness qualities of the areas which it desig-
nated. 3 Congress found that the lands delineated by the Act are princi-
pally headwaters, with few, if any, upstream "water resource facilities,"
and few, if any, opportunities for diversion, storage or other uses of wa-
ter that would adversely affect wilderness values.'3 Congress also found
229. Pub. L. No. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4469.
230. Cf. Wilderness Society Letter, supra note 206, at 3.
231. Arizona Desert Wilderness Act § 101 (g), 104 Stat. at 4473-74.
232. Pub. L. No. 103-77, 107 Stat. 756.
233. See Colorado Wilderness Act § 8(b)(2)(A), 107 Stat. at 762.
234. Section 8(a)(3) of the Colorado Wilderness Act defines "water resource facility" to mean
"irrigation and pumping facilities, reservoirs, water conservation works, aqueducts, canals, ditches,
pipelines, wells, hydropower projects, and transmission and other ancillary facilities, and other water
diversion, storage, and carriage structures." Id. § 8(a)(3).
235. See id. § 8(a)(l)(A).
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that the lands reserved for wilderness by the Act are not suitable for de-
velopment or expansion of water resource facilities.' For these reasons,
Congress determined that "it is possible to provide for proper manage-
ment and protection of the wilderness value of such lands in ways differ-
ent from those utilized in other legislation designating [wilderness ar-
eas]." 7 Accordingly, the Act protects the wilderness qualities and values
of the areas designated "by means other than those based on a Federal
reserved water right."'
To underscore its intention to rely on mechanisms other than federal
reserved water rights to protect wilderness qualities, Congress prohibited
any federal official, agency or court from asserting or considering any
claim for water or water rights in the State of Colorado "which is based
on any construction of any portion of this Act, or the designation of any
lands as wilderness by this Act." 9
Congress attempted to limit the precedential effect of these unusual
water rights provisions by declaring that nothing in the Colorado Wilder-
ness Act "shall be construed as a creation, recognition, disclaimer, relin-
quishment, or reduction" of preexisting federal water rights, ' or an in-
terpretation of any other legislative act or designation, except as related to
the water rights created by the Platte River Wilderness Act?" Furthermore,
Congress stated that "[n]othing in the section shall be construed as estab-
lishing a precedent with regard to any future wilderness designations.""2
The remainder of the water rights-related provisions in the Colorado
Wilderness Act concern development of access to water resources facili-
ties, and the effect of the Act on the Interstate Compact for the North
Platte River.' 3 The President and other federal officials are prohibited
from funding, assisting or approving the development of new water re-
source facilities in wilderness areas designated by the Act, but existing
facilities and access are grandfathered.'" The Act has no effect on the
North Platte River Interstate Compact or equitable apportionment de-
crees that apportion water among Colorado and other states.'
236. See id. § 8(a)(1)(B).
237. Id. § 8(a)(1)(C).
238. Id. § 8(a)(I)(2).
239. Id § 8(b)(1).
240. Id § 8(b)(2)(B).
241. See id. § 8(g).
242. Id. § 8(b)(2)(D).
243. Cf. id § 8(c)-(g) (allowing the Secretary to permit reasonable access to water resource
facilities already in existence).
244. See id § 8(c)-(e).
245. See id. § 8(g).
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VII. STATUS OF THE ISSUE TODAY
A. General Stream Adjudication
Although the congressional controversy over wilderness water rights
dissipated following the passage of the Colorado Wilderness Act, the
substantive question of whether wilderness has implied federal reserved
water rights remains. In 1993, the United States again faced a deadline
for filing claims for federal reserved water rights for wilderness areas,
this time in the Snake River Basin Adjudication.' At issue were three
significant wilderness areas: the Frank Church-River of No Return, the
Selway-Bitterroot and the Gospel-Hump. 7 The legislation creating these
wilderness areas was silent concerning water rights."8
A new Administration had come to Washington, D.C., with a new
perspective on federal reserved water rights for wilderness. On Decem-
ber 8, 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno notified Secretary of the Inte-
rior Babbitt of the Justice Department's intent to reexamine the policy
expressed in the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion. 9 Pending completion of this
review by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, Attorney
General Reno suspended Attorney General Meese's directive to federal
agencies not to claim federal reserved water rights for wilderness areas in
stream adjudications.'
On December 28, 1993, the Departments of the Interior and Agri-
culture, in consultation with the Department of Justice, sought public
comment on the reevaluation of the position taken by the Solicitor in his
1988 Opinion." The Solicitor's Opinion was suspended pending receipt
of comment. 2 Subsequently, the Departments of the Interior and Agri-
culture withdrew the Solicitor's Opinion, as well as Attorney General
Meese's concurrence with it, in a Federal Register notice extending the
comment period. 3 No replacement opinion has yet been issued. With-
drawal of the Attorney General's directive permitted the United States to
file claims for water rights for the three wilderness areas involved in the
246. See Haugrnd Interview, supra note 205; see also In re Snake River Basin Adjudication,
Case No. 39576 (Dist. Ct. Idaho Dec. 18, 1997) (order granting and denying United States' motions
for summary judgment on reserved water rights claims).
247. See Haugrud Interview, supra note 205.
248. The Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness was created by the Wilderness Act of 1964; the Frank
Church-River of No Return Wilderness by the Central Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-312, 94 Stat. 948, and Act of March 14, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-231, 98 Stat. 60 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1132 note); and the Gospel-Hump Wilderness by the Endangered American Wilderness Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-237,92 Stat. 46 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note).
249. See Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt
(Dec. 8, 1993) (on file with author).
250. See id.
251. Cf. Water Rights Under the Wilderness Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,629,68,629 (1993).
252. See id.
253. See Water Rights Under the Wilderness Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,692, 19,692 (1994).
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Snake River Basin Adjudication. These claims were based on the Win-
ters Doctrine.6'
On December 18, 1997, Judge Daniel Hurlbutt, Jr., the judge pre-
siding over the adjudication, granted the United States' motion for sum-
mary judgment on the legal issue of whether the United States was enti-
tled to claim reserved water rights under the Acts creating the wilderness
areas.n The Judge concluded that the United States was entitled to a fed-
eral reserved water right for all the unappropriated flows in the three
wilderness areas.' He found, as a matter of law, that "the entire amount
of unappropriated water constituting the natural flow in each designated
wilderness area is the amount necessary to fulfill Congress's intent to
preserve and protect the wilderness areas for which claims have been
filed in the [Snake River Basin Adjudication]. '
The judge discounted the assertion of the objectors that wilderness is
a secondary purpose, supplemental to the overriding purposes of the land
system from which the wilderness is created.' He stated,
Under the Wilderness Act, Congress intended to create a new cate-
gory of land in which wilderness purposes would be primary and
above all other purposes previously allowed in national forests. These
wilderness purposes would then be permanently protected by legisla-
tive, not executive action.29
The Judge also considered the meaning of the "no claim or denial"
language in section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act.'e He determined that
Congress included the language to maintain the status quo in the law
governing United States water rights." As support for this finding, the
Judge relied on the Wilderness Act's legislative history, in particular the
explanations offered by Senator Humphrey,' and the fact that statutes
like the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act subsequently used the same lan-
guage.' In short, the Judge evaluated the application of the Winters
Doctrine to wilderness areas in the same manner as the court in Sierra
254. See Haugrud Interview, supra note 205.
255. See In re Snake River Basin Adjudication, Case No. 39576, at 2-3 (Dist. Ct. Idaho Dec.
18, 1997) (order granting and denying United States' motions for summary judgment on reserved
water rights claims).
256. See Snake River Basin Adjudication, Case No. 39576, at 16.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 8-9.
259. Id. at 7.
260. See id. at 11-12.
261. See id. at 12.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 12-13 The Judge quoted Senator Church's comments on the meaning of the "no
claim or denial" language in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. See id The Senator stated that "[tihe
whole purpose of the language in the sections to which the Senator has referred... was to maintain
the status quo with respect to the whole complicated structure of water law." 112 CONG. REC. 431
(1966).
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Club v. Block, and reached the same conclusion. Not surprisingly, the
objectors have appealed Judge Hurlbutt's decision to the Supreme Court
of Idaho.'
B. On Capitol Hill
On Capitol Hill, things are relatively quiet where water rights are
concerned. Only a few wilderness areas have been designated since
1993.' The quiet belies congressional resolution of the issue. A signifi-
cant conflict over wilderness in Utah has been brewing for the past sev-
eral years. The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) blocked
wilderness bills proposed by the Utah delegation in the 104th Congress,
in part because the bills expressly disavowed water rights for the areas to
be designated.' SUWA and other groups also opposed a bill for the San
Rafael region of Utah in part because it disclaimed water rights for the
area. ' This bill was defeated in October of 1998.
264. See Idaho Supreme Court Nos. 24545-24548, 24557-24559; In re SRBA Case No. 39576,
Wilderness Reserved Claims, Consolidated Subcase No. 75-13605; Hells Canyon National Recrea-
tion Area Claims, Consolidated Subcase No. 79-13597, Supreme Court of Idaho (1998).
265. The most significant of these designations was made by the California Desert Protection
Act, which established a national park, as well as a number of wilderness areas. The water rights
language in the Act is similar to that used in the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990. It reserves
a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the Act, with a priority date of the enactment
of the statute. The Secretary and other federal officers are directed to "take all steps necessary" to
protect the water rights reserved by the Act, including the filing of claims in stream adjudications.
Nothing in the Act is to be construed as a relinquishment or reduction of any water rights reserved or
appropriated by the United States before the Act was passed. Finally, the California Desert Protec-
tion Act is not to be interpreted as creating any precedent for future designations or for any other
Act. See California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-433, § 706, 108 Stat. 4471. Two
1990 statutes creating wilderness in Illinois and Maine are silent on water and water rights. See
Illinois Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-633, 104 Stat. 4577; Maine Wilderness Act of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-401,104 Stat. 863.
266. See H.R. 1745, 104th Cong. § 4(a) (1995); S. 884, 104th Cong. § 4(a) (1995). Section 4 of
these bills stated that "[niothing in this Act or any other Act of Congress shall constitute or be con-
strued to constitute either an express or implied Federal reservation of water or water rights for any
purpose arising from the designation of areas as wilderness by this Act." Id. The bill further provided
that the United States "may acquire and exercise such water rights as it deems necessary" pursuant to
Utah State law. S. 884 § 4(b).
267. See S. 2385, 105th Cong. § 304(a)-(b) (1998). Section 304 states:
(a) Congress finds that-
(1) The San Rafael Swell region of Utah has a high desert climate with little annual
precipitation and scarce water resources;
(2) in order to preserve the limited amount of water available to wildlife, the State of
Utah has granted to the Division of Wildlife Resources an instream flow right in the
San Rafael River; and
(3) this preserved right will guarantee that wetland and riparian habitats within the
San Rafael region will be protected for designations such as wilderness, semi-
primitive areas, bighorn sheep areas, and other Federal land needs within the San
Rafael Swell region.
(b) No Federal Reservation-Nothing in this Act or any other Act of Congress constitutes
an express or implied Federal Reservation of water or water rights for any purpose arising
from the designation of any area as part of the Conservation Area or as a wilderness or
semi-primitive area under this Act.
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Prospects seemed good for H.R. 1500 during the fall of 1998, but the
congressional session ended without its enactment. The bill expressly
reserved a "quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of this
Act."2' It also directed the Secretary of the Interior and all other officers
of the United States to:
[T]ake all steps necessary to protect the rights reserved.., including
the filing by the Secretary of a claim for the quantification of such
rights in any present or future appropriate stream adjudication in the
courts of the State of Utah in which the United States is or may be
joined and which is conducted in accordance with... the McCarran
Act.
2 9
H.R. 1500 will be reintroduced in the spring of 1999 under a different
number, but the environmental community is not optimistic about pas-
sage of this, or any other Utah wilderness bill during this Congress.
BLM lands remain on the wilderness designation agenda. Only two
of the western states (California and Arizona) have designated BLM wil-
derness. Thus the issue of water rights for wilderness will have to be
addressed for all of the others. BLM lands are often downstream. Al-
though rights for newly created BLM wilderness areas would be very
junior in priority, this will not prevent debate over the effect of federal
water rights on upstream users.
VIL CONCLUSION: IMAGINE WILDERNESS
Some observers may say that there is now little cause for concern
about the legal issue of whether the Winters Doctrine applies to wilder-
ness. The United States has withdrawn the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion and
claimed reserved water rights for wilderness in general stream adjudica-
tions. The presiding judge in the Snake River Basin Adjudication
strongly agreed with the application of the Winters Doctrine to wilder-
ness. The legislation establishing wilderness areas, which was enacted
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, recognized the importance of wa-
ter for wilderness and assured the availability of sufficient water to pro-
tect wilderness qualities, even if federal reserved rights were not the cho-
sen vehicle. Congress has made no declaration that wilderness is not a
reservation entitled to federal reserved water rights to fulfill its primary
purposes.
All of this is correct, but does not mean that the issue is finally re-
solved. Each time Congress considers a wilderness bill, the question of
water rights must be addressed. Each time the United States files claims
for wilderness in a general stream adjudication, objectors will oppose
recognition of those rights. Whether Congress says nothing or expressly
268. H.R. 1500, 104th Cong. § 202(a) (1998).
269. Id. § 202(a)(2).
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reserves water rights, other areas in the System are potentially affected.
The same is true whether the United States files or does not file for wil-
derness water rights in stream adjudications.
Congress could settle this matter, of course, although the maxim
about being careful what you wish for because you might get it does
come to mind. The easiest way would be to amend the Wilderness Act of
1964 to express Congress's intent that wilderness has rights to all the
water flowing in and through it, or at least rights to all the water neces-
sary to fulfill the purposes for which wilderness areas are created. A less
naive suggestion is for Congress to develop and use a model water rights
provision which includes the elements identified by the environmental
community in 1989: an express reservation of all water necessary to ful-
fill all reservation purposes; direction to the federal agencies to take steps
to perfect these rights in appropriate state proceedings; and a statement
that wilderness constitutes a reservation with primary purposes, for
which water rights are implied when legislation is silent. Such model lan-
guage does not threaten state law or valid existing rights. It acknowledges
that wilderness has water rights, but requires that such rights be quantified
in state proceedings. It removes the cloud of uncertainty surrounding wil-
derness areas designated by legislation silent on water rights.
Professor Janice Weis has noted that "[a] uniform, national water
policy for protecting wilderness areas is more desirable than a piecemeal,
state-by-state determination of wilderness water rights."'' She is correct,
but only if the agenda of those opposing water rights for wilderness is
not to prevent additions to the Wilderness System or to fight restrictions
on use of federal lands for non-commodity purposes.
A number of environmentalists and water lawyers have repeatedly
pointed out that wilderness rarely conflicts with the appropriation and use
of water rights."' Wilderness does not consume water, except in its natural
processes. Water flows through wilderness areas, undiverted and unsullied,
available for downstream appropriation. Most wilderness areas are located
at or near the headwaters of streams, so there are few upstream appropria-
tors who must leave water in the stream to fulfill wilderness rights. Fur-
ther, because wilderness is a relatively new legislative creation, most wil-
derness areas are junior in priority. They take their place in line and must
yield to more senior rights, even in times of shortage and drought.
270. Weis, supra note 4, at 150. For Weis's proposed legislative solution, see id. at 148-53.
271. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 395-98 & n.38 (noting that after the initial decision in Sierra
Club v. Block, members of the Colorado congressional delegation asked the Colorado Department of
Natural Resources to report on the conflicts between wilderness water rights and other uses). The
Department concluded that "there is little actual or potential conflict between existing or conditional
water rights and any federal reserved rights that may be established in existing or proposed wilder-
ness areas on Colorado National Forests." Id at 398 n.38 (quoting Letter from David Getches and
Jeris Danielson to Sen. Gary Hart, Rep. Hank Brown, and Rep. Ken Kramer 3 (Feb. 24, 1986)); see
also Weis, supra note 4, at 142-44; Marks, supra note 129, at 651-52 (reviewing the results of the
Colorado Department of Natural Resources Report).
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About the only potential for conflict between wilderness and water
use is when a senior appropriator proposes to change his point of diver-
sion or place and manner of use in a way that affects stream flows
through wilderness. Under prior appropriation law, a senior appropriator
may not alter any aspect of his water right, including point of diversion,
timing, manner or place of water use, if the change will harm a junior
appropriator.' The United States, like any other junior appropriator,
could block a change that would impair water flows in wilderness.'
If it is true that wilderness poses little threat to appropriators of wa-
ter, why is the antagonism to federal reserved water rights for wilderness
so pronounced? Why does the environmental community insist on the
creation of water rights, when the location of most wilderness areas pro-
tects their water from appropriation? Is this a real fight, or shadow-boxing?
The answer to the question about the hostility to federal reserved
rights brings us back to the early days of the settlement of the West. It
speaks to the significance for Westerners of the right to use water in a
region characterized by aridity. It reflects the idea that water is not to be
"wasted" in a stream, but diverted and applied to economic activity.
Wrapped up in the answer, as well, are anti-federal government senti-
ments, aversion to "tree huggers," and antipathy for outsiders seen as
trying to dictate how life should be led.
The answer to the question about the environmental community's
insistence on water rights has to do with common sense, ecology, and the
future. It is logical to extend the Winters Doctrine to wilderness, as the
Supreme Court extended it to national parks, national wildlife refuges,
national monuments and other reservations of federal lands. It makes no
sense to conclude that Congress created a system of lands retaining their
"primeval character and influence" and managed "so as to preserve
[their] natural conditions"' without providing such a system with water.
In the future, the National Wilderness Preservation System may be ex-
panded to include mid-stream or downstream areas. It will be important
to have agreement on the availability of the water rights needed to sup-
port the communities of life within these areas, to assure that they will be
full partners in the Wilderness Preservation System.
Finally, to make sense, law that impacts the natural environment
must be based on scientifically sound principles. Law may be able to
sever water from land for purposes of allocating rights of use. However,
it cannot sever land from its need for water, or even lessen the critical
role that water plays in sustaining life.
Imagine wilderness without water. Imagine...
272. See TARLOCK, supra note 15, § 5.17[3][a].
273. Cf Marks, supra note 129, at 651-55.
274. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
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